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Abstract
In this article, we employ a Veblenian framework to analyze 
three dimensions of corporate financialization: the expan-
sion of the balance sheet, the rising importance of intan-
gible assets and the growing levels of financial payouts. 
Our focus is the pharmaceutical sector, which is strongly 
dominated by a handful of large corporations known as 
Big Pharma. In our empirical analysis of the financial ac-
counts of 27 of the largest global pharmaceutical corpora-
tions for the years 2000–2018, we find evidence of a shift 
in Big Pharma’s business model from one focused on pro-
ductive capacity (reflected by fixed capital and R&D) to one 
focused on intangible assets (reflected by patents, brands 
and goodwill). The modus operandi of Big Pharma is one 
which increasingly resembles that of a private equity fund 
which generates returns for shareholders that are support-
ed by monopolized knowledge through intellectual property 
rights, capitalized future earnings potential and rising debt 
burdens. Our framework facilitates the study of the differ-
ent elements of financialization and how they do (or do not) 
co-evolve over time, within and between industries, and be-
tween countries or global regions.
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Resumen
En este artículo, empleamos un marco Vebleniano para ana-
lizar tres dimensiones de la financiarización corporativa: la 
expansión del balance, la creciente importancia de los acti-
vos intangibles y los crecientes niveles de pagos financieros. 
Nuestro enfoque es el sector farmacéutico, que está fuerte-
mente dominado por un puñado de grandes corporaciones 
conocidas como Big Pharma. En nuestro análisis empírico 
de las cuentas financieras de 27 de las mayores corpora-
ciones farmacéuticas mundiales para los años 2000-2018, 
encontramos evidencia de un cambio en el modelo de ne-
gocio de uno centrado en la capacidad productiva (reflejado 
por capital fijo e I + D) a uno centrado en activos intangibles 
(reflejados en patentes, marcas y fondo de comercio). El 
modus operandi de las grandes farmacéuticas se asemeja 
cada vez más al de un fondo de capital privado que genera 
rendimientos para los accionistas respaldados por el conoci-
miento monopolizado a través de los derechos de propiedad 
intelectual, el potencial de ganancias futuras capitalizadas y 
el aumento de la carga de la deuda. Nuestro marco facilita 
el estudio de los diferentes elementos de la financiarización 
y cómo co-evolucionan (o no) a lo largo del tiempo, dentro y 
entre industrias, y entre países o regiones globales.
Palabras Clave
Finanzas corporativas; Activos intangibles; Monopolio; 
Valor del accionista; Thorstein Veblen.
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1. Introduction
Financialization has become an increasingly 
popular yet fuzzy concept to frame and investi-
gate a wide range of developments in society. Its 
growing scope has seen scholars note its ambigu-
ity in application more than a decade ago (Lee et 
al. 2009) with subsequent reviews of the literature 
such as Van der Zwan’s (2014) narrowing it down 
to three overarching themes: the emergence of a 
post-Fordist regime of accumulation propelled by 
the growth of finance, the rise of the shareholder 
value orientation and the financialization of every-
day life. More recently, Aalbers (2019) provided a 
classification of financialization into seven themes: 
financialization as a historically recurring process 
signalling the autumn of hegemonic powers in the 
world system; the financial services revolution re-
garding the emergence of new financial institutions 
and changes in the behaviour of the existing ones; 
the increasing dominance of the financial sector in 
terms of size; financialization of non-financial firms 
around new financial narratives, practices and 
measurements; financialization as assetization of 
commodities; financialization of the state; and fi-
nancialization of households.
In this article, we present the evidence for the 
financialization of non-financial firms, taking the 
global pharmaceutical sector as an example. Our 
interest is primarily in this sector as a possible field 
of corporate financialization rather than in pharma-
ceuticals per se. The reason to focus on this sector 
is two-fold. On one hand, pharmaceuticals have a 
strong social significance because of their life-sus-
taining functions and the modes of their production 
are hence vital to understand, especially given the 
fundamental role of publicly-funded research in de-
veloping medicine. On the other hand, the global 
pharmaceutical market is one of growing economic 
significance as it has seen more than a 200 percent 
rise in revenue between 2001 and 2018, which in 
2018 amounted to more than USD1.2 trillion and is 
projected to grow (Statista 2019: 2). What is more, 
the sector has a track record as a harbinger for fi-
nancialized corporate strategy (Andersson et al. 
2010; Froud et al. 2006).
We dissect the financial accounts of the global 
pharmaceutical oligopoly or “Big Pharma” as rep-
resented by the sector’s largest firms. Rather than 
focusing on one key element of corporate financial-
ization as most of the previous empirical studies 
have done, we scrutinize the three main trends: the 
expansion of the balance sheet, the growing reli-
ance on intangible assets and the increasing use 
of corporate funds as financial payouts. Only when 
combining these three dimensions can we come to 
a rigorous assessment of the level of corporate fi-
nancialization in firms and sectors. On all three ac-
counts, we find evidence of a Big Pharma business 
model that generates returns for shareholders which 
are supported by monopolized knowledge through 
intellectual property rights, capitalized future earn-
ings potential and rising debt burdens. In sum, we 
argue that the operating mode of Big Pharma in-
creasingly resembles that of a private equity fund.
This operating mode builds on a Veblenian 
understanding of business dynamics, which un-
derlines the tendency of corporations to obstruct 
competition and thus attain higher prices for their 
products. Intangible assets are one prime lever to 
do so and have become a crucial element of the 
pharmaceutical sector. They enable corporations 
to derive incomes—or borrow against these as-
sets to get disposable cash—to pass on payouts 
to shareholders and corporate executives. At the 
same time, intangible assets represent capitalized 
future earnings that inflate the balance sheet and 
hence propel corporate strategies to pursue what-
ever operations seem the most profitable, sparking 
new rounds of intangible asset formation. Although 
corporate strategies vary, the degree to which cor-
porations rely on intangible assets can be signifi-
cant for multiple reasons. For example, if a corpo-
ration has a high degree of intangible assets, this 
may be a sign that it is prioritizing investment in 
expensive specialized medicine over cheap mass 
products, which may have important, broader dis-
tributional consequences (e.g. access to medicine 
by consumers).
The article is structured as follows. In section 2, we 
review corporate financialization trends more broadly 
and revisit the work of Veblen in order to provide a 
framework for analysis. In section 3.1, we present 
the methods that led us to the empirical results that 
are presented in section 3.2. In section 4, we discuss 
these results in their relation to the existing body of 
work and conclude in section 5.
2. What is corporate financializa-
tion?
The literature on corporate financialization tends 
to be inspired by different heterodox econom-
ics frameworks. Keynesian and, to a lesser extent, 
Marxian frameworks feature predominantly, but re-
cently we can also witness the emergence of Veble-
nian analyses of financialization (Baranes and Hake 
2018; Baranes 2017; 2016; Jo and Henry 2015). To 
us, Thorstein Veblen’s institutionalist understanding 
of the business enterprise serves as a useful start-
ing point to analyze the different components of cor-
porate financialization, as they are, to some extent, 
already identified in Veblen’s work. In this section, we 
will briefly summarize our reading of Veblen before 
relating it to ongoing debates in the financialization 
literature more widely. 
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2.1. Veblenian conceptualizations of assets 
and differential advantage
Veblen’s institutionalist theory of the business en-
terprise positions industry and business as opposite 
and antagonistic poles. While industry represents the 
side of the material production of goods and is con-
cerned with the perpetual improvement of the inter-
play between different production stages, business is 
its modern “pecuniary” (i.e. profit-driven) counterpart, 
subordinating the industrial process to its imperatives 
and thereby both intentionally and unintentionally dis-
rupting or enhancing it according to the specific cir-
cumstances (Veblen 1958 [1904]).
Veblen’s conceptualization of assets is closely re-
lated to the distinction between industry and busi-
ness.1 Through the development of a non-individ-
ualistic theory of production, he emphasized that 
societies develop according to accumulated knowl-
edge that increasingly outgrows any individual’s ca-
pacity. As soon as this occurs and the accumulated 
knowledge is materialized in the form of machinery 
and technology, it can be enclosed and withheld 
from society for pecuniary gain, secured by nothing 
but legal entitlements and the state power which en-
sures them. For Veblen, such enclosure—privatized 
social knowledge—is the defining trait of capitalism 
(Veblen 1908a).
In this context, a business enterprise’s investment 
becomes first and foremost a pecuniary transaction, 
designed to facilitate the “extensive engrossing of 
the community’s industrial efficiency” (Veblen 1908b: 
105), either by seizing materialized or immaterial 
knowledge. Only under such circumstances does 
Veblen speak of “assets” as such. To the owner of 
these assets, they become a means of exerting a dif-
ferential advantage over competitors insofar as they 
serve to enhance the price of the final product. The 
capacity to increase earnings is capitalized and re-
valued on a recurring basis, constantly imputing the 
value of assets anew. Therefore, assets only exist 
under a set of social relations, namely general com-
modity production and wage labour. As tangible as-
sets, they “owe their productivity and their value to 
the immaterial industrial expedients which they em-
body or which their ownership enables their owner to 
engross” (Veblen 1908a: 539). As intangible assets, 
the theoretical “immaterial industrial expedients” are 
legally formalized and serve to obstruct competition 
through growing market power and to maintain en-
hanced prices by “locking out” society from its “stock 
of knowledge” (Veblen 1908a: 519). To gain access 
to this stock of knowledge, monetary returns are de-
manded by the proprietors. Less exposed to competi-
tive pressures, intangible assets can thus be utilized 
to generate rent incomes (Baranes and Hake 2018; 
Veblen 1908a). However, the power to do so is not 
only reflected in the imputed value of these assets 
but also of “goodwill” (Veblen 1958 [1904]). 
Crucially, when credit systems are well-developed, 
the relation runs in both directions. Business enter-
prises that attain a level of market power and differ-
ential advantage through intangible assets are likely 
to have easy access to credit due to their asset-base, 
while easy credit also facilitates the investment in or 
the acquisition of intangibles to enlarge their market 
power (Veblen 1958 [1904]). This is precisely what 
Baranes and Hake (2018: 434; emphasis in origi-
nal) describe: “[t]he ability for managers to gener-
ate returns for their shareholders depends on their 
ability to increase not the productive capacity of the 
enterprise, but the earning capacity of the enterprise 
– more specifically, the perceived earning capacity”.
Finally, the aims of the business enterprise (i.e. pe-
cuniary gain) and Veblen’s “community” at large (i.e. 
serviceable output) usually diverge from each other 
but clash even stronger when business ownership 
and the enterprise’s operations are steered towards 
short-term financial gains. Here again, as credit sys-
tems grow more sophisticated, so do the opportu-
nities to utilize their channels and means to obtain 
these gains (Jo and Henry 2015).
2.2. Veblen meets 21st century financialization
Veblen’s theoretical framework, as briefly in-
troduced above, helps us to read some of the re-
cent trends in the financialization of the economy. 
In a more structural sense, financialization can 
be defined “as a pattern of accumulation in which 
profits accrue primarily through financial channels 
rather than through trade and commodity produc-
tion” (Krippner 2005: 174). Broken down further, it 
is constituted by “the increasing dominance of finan-
cial actors, markets, practices, measurements, and 
narratives, at various scales, resulting in a structural 
transformation of economies, firms (including finan-
cial institutions), states, and households” (Aalbers 
2019: 4). In other words, financialization can be un-
derstood as a number of interdependent processes 
connecting several economic agents and objects, 
which entail transformations in their relations (Du-
rand 2017; Lapavitsas 2013). Strongly bound up 
with neoliberal restructuring policies following the 
collapse of the post-war Bretton Woods framework, 
financialization processes—such as the rising im-
portance of the FIRE (finance, insurance and real 
estate) sectors, growing global debt levels and the 
powerful discourse about the importance of share-
holder value for firms—have placed financial actors 
and financial logics at the heart of economic activity 
(Hofman and Aalbers 2019; Hudson 2015).
Corporate financialization developments can ac-
cordingly be defined as “traditionally nonfinancial 
firms becoming dominated by financial narratives, 
practices, and measurements, and increasingly par-
taking in practices that have been the domain of the 
financial sector” (Aalbers 2019: 3). The outcomes of 
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these developments have been quantified in a wide 
range of studies but can roughly be grouped in three 
sets of trends: the expansion of the balance sheet, 
the growing reliance on intangible assets and the rise 
in financial payouts. It is worth discussing each of 
these trends in turn.
First, both the asset and liability sides of corporate 
balance sheets grow. On the asset side, firms grant or 
receive greater levels of credit (through receivables, 
various current assets or payable accounts), increase 
their holdings of cash and short-term investments 
(stocks or other commercial paper) or even move to-
wards investing in long-term investments (bonds). As 
a result, liquid assets grow in relative importance to 
fixed assets, representing one of corporate financial-
ization’s most widely noted trends (Davis 2018; Tori 
and Onaran 2018b; Davis 2016; Tomaskovic-Devey, 
Lin, and Meyers 2015; Lapavitsas and Powell 2013; 
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009; Orhangazi 2008; In-
ternational Monetary Fund 2006). While influential 
early contributions (Orhangazi 2008; Krippner 2005) 
underscored the importance of financial incomes de-
rived from these liquid assets for nonfinancial firms, 
more recent work (Rabinovich 2019; Fiebiger 2016) 
has called this into question. Nevertheless, rising 
shares of liquid—though not necessarily financial as-
sets—have been generally documented. At the same 
time, fixed capital shares have often fallen (Tori and 
Onaran 2018b; Stockhammer 2004) although the 
causal relationship is still contested and might not be 
universally valid (Kliman and Williams 2015). 
On the liability side, the 1990s and early 2000s saw 
the corporate sector in the Global North deleveraging 
and decreasing its debt levels (International Mone-
tary Fund 2006). However, since the global financial 
crisis and subsequent years of unprecedented loose 
monetary policy (Fernandez, Bortz and Zeolla 2018), 
corporate indebtedness has again been on the rise, 
in particular in countries of the Global South (Inter-
national Monetary Fund 2019; Kaltenbrunner 2018; 
Karwowski and Stockhammer 2017; Durand 2017; 
Davis 2016). Large firms in the Global North have 
also taken on more debt, mostly to sustain high finan-
cial payouts to shareholders without having to repa-
triate profits stashed away in offshore accounts (Fer-
nandez and Hendrikse 2015; Lazonick 2013). Hence, 
we find rising debt levels for different reasons.
Second, intangible assets have become more 
relevant to many—and especially large—firms’ busi-
ness models, signifying a shift in firms’ capital stock 
from fixed capital to intangible capital. The obvious 
question then arises how firms generate their returns 
(Crotty 2003). Part of the answer might be found in 
intangible assets including intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), such as patents and brands, market rights or 
customer relations which constrain competition and 
facilitate monopolization (Serfati 2008; Zeller 2007). 
These enable firms to exert more power over value 
chains and hence capture greater shares of the to-
tal value generated, as demonstrated by Orhangazi 
(2018) and Durand and Milberg (2020). As such, the 
massive growth of intangible assets is very much 
related to one of the longest-standing debates in 
political economy between “earned” and “unearned” 
income, i.e. between profit and rent (Serfati 2011; 
2008; Zeller 2007). Such themes have recently re-
surfaced in both academic and policy circles (Chris-
tophers 2019; UNCTAD 2018; 2017). Another impor-
tant type of intangible assets is goodwill, which is 
an “accounting artefact” (Leaver 2018) on a firm’s 
balance sheet reflecting the difference between what 
an acquiring firm pays for another firm on top of the 
latter’s book price. As capitalized earnings capacity 
purely generated by financial markets, goodwill is a 
representation of what a firm is considered to yield 
in the future according to its assessment in financial 
markets, in accordance with “fair value” accounting 
principles (Serfati 2011; Perry and Nölke 2006). By 
inflating the balance sheet further, the future pros-
pects impact upon a firm’s strategy by lowering key 
financial indicators of performance (Andersson, 
Haslam, and Lee 2006). 
Third, firms have channelled a growing share of 
their cash flow—or even newly acquired debt—to 
shareholders and corporate executives in the form 
of dividends or share operations (together known as 
payouts), in line with the shift towards shareholder 
value orientation from the 1980s onwards (Ireland 
2009; Froud et al. 2000). Through dividends, firms 
hand cash directly to shareholders; through share 
operations such as share repurchases, sharehold-
ers and corporate executives potentially benefit at 
the same time. In the case of share repurchases, 
active shareholders receive higher dividends per 
share due to the reduced number of outstanding 
shares while exiting shareholders realize capital 
gains by selling their shares at boosted prices. In 
addition, corporate executives who receive per-
formance-related pay or stock options also ben-
efit from increased prices (Froud et al. 2006). The 
staggering extent of these practices has been well 
documented for US firms in particular (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000). As corollaries, firms that engage 
in large-scale financial payouts are observed to ne-
glect crucial long-term goals such as investment in 
fixed capital, research and development (R&D) or 
employment relations (Lazonick 2013; 2014).
By combining Veblen’s theoretical framework with 
the trends of corporate financialization, key relations 
become more visible. The noted trend towards intan-
gible assets helps to “lock out” society from its prod-
ucts, and keeps competition at bay. The contribution 
of intangible assets to a firm’s earning capacity can 
then be capitalized on the balance sheet, in the form 
of clear elements such as patents or more ambigu-
ous categories such as goodwill. To some extent, 
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replacing tangible, fixed assets with intangibles can 
free up financial resources which can then either be 
hoarded as financial resources (e.g. to engage in 
further expansion through mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As), invested elsewhere, or—and this appears 
to have become the preferred mode—distributed to 
shareholders and corporate executives. 
3. Empirical analysis
Having developed a basic understanding of 
corporate financialization processes, this section 
presents our data and methods which we use to 
evaluate whether we find instances of it in the phar-
maceutical industry.
3.1. Data and methods
In order to complement the existing literature, 
we offer a multi-faceted view on Big Pharma’s past 
financial dynamics. In particular, we have delved 
into the annual financial accounts of 27 of the 
largest pharmaceuticals and biotech corporations 
worldwide, based on 2018 market capitalization, 
for the years 2000 to 2018 (Table 1). Initially we 
selected the 30 largest ones but needed to drop 
three (Abbvie, China Resources Pharmaceutical 
Group and Otsuka Holdings), as they have only 
existed in their current form since 2010 or later. 
Furthermore, we expand the geographical scope 
of studies into Big Pharma, which tend to focus on 
the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK (Baranes 
2017; Lazonick and Tulum 2011; Andersson et al. 
2010; but see Montalban and Sakinç 2013 for a 
larger sample). Still, US corporations (10) domi-
nate the dataset and are only equalled in number 
by all European—EU and non-EU—corporations 
combined (10). Beyond these two blocs, only one 
country (Japan) is represented in the dataset with 




Rank Name Domicile Group Revenue (USD billion), 2018
Market capitalization 
(USD billion), 2018
1 Johnson & Johnson United States US 81.58 347.51
2 Roche Switzerland Europe 57.92 258.46
3 Pfizer United States US 53.65 212.23
4 Novartis Switzerland Europe 53.17 219.96
5 Bayer Germany Europe 45.40 72.34
6 Merck & Co United States US 42.29 221.88
7 Sanofi France Europe 40.92 115.40
8 GlaxoSmithKline United Kingdom Europe 39.32 113.83
9 Eli Lilly & Co United States US 24.56 109.41
10 Amgen United States US 23.75 126.71
11 Bristol-Myers Squibb United States US 22.56 93.84
12 Gilead Sciences United States US 22.13 80.69
13 AstraZeneca United Kingdom Europe 22.09 126.95
14 Takeda Pharmaceutical Co Japan Other 18.92 58.37
15 Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Israel Other 18.85 8.92
16 Novo Nordisk Denmark Europe 17.18 101.71
17 Merck Germany Europe 17.02 15.40
18 Allergan Ireland Europe 15.79 57.78
19 Celgene United States US 15.28 76.57
20 Biogen United States US 13.45 53.90
21 Astellas Pharma Japan Other 11.79 32.18
22 Mylan Netherlands Europe 11.43 9.88
23 CSL Australia Other 8.54 80.92
24 Daiichi Sankyo Co Japan Other 8.39 45.03
25 Bausch Health Companies Canada Other 8.38 8.76
26 Regeneron Pharmaceuticals United States US 6.71 33.07
27 Guangzhou Baiyun-shan Pharmaceutica China Other 6.39 8.09
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the literature. First, we examine financial reserves 
and liabilities to see how strongly the balance sheet 
has grown and what broad fragilities might exist 
as a consequence. Second, we consider financial 
payouts (i.e. dividends and share operations) to un-
derstand the level to which shareholders have been 
benefitting from Big Pharma’s current financialized 
business model. Third, we track the rising impor-
tance of intangible assets in general and goodwill in 
particular to assess potential shifts towards a finan-
cialized business model.
Expanding the balance sheet
Both sides of the balance sheets have grown over 
recent years for the 27 corporations as a whole. Cash 
and short-term investments, representing the most 
liquid of corporate assets, have increased nominal-
ly by more than 160 percent from USD83 billion to 
219 billion during the years 2000 to 2018 (Figure 1). 
When measured as share of net fixed capital, we see 
a general rise from 0.87 to 1.09 in the same period, 
peaking as high as 1.29 in 2014 (Figure 2). 
However, these aggregate numbers conceal im-
portant differences. If we compare US- and Euro-
pean corporations (Table 1)3, only the former exhibit 
a strongly rising ratio of cash and short-term invest-
ments as share of net fixed capital and mainly since 
2009. European corporations, on the other hand, 
have maintained a largely stable ratio (Figure 2). The 
fact that the aggregate numbers show an upward 
trend merely indicates the heavy weight of the US 
corporations’ financial reserves. In nominal terms, 
We contribute to the existing literature by expanding 
the list of examined indicators and provide an update 
on the years following the global financial crisis (GFC). 
Selected data (Table 2) were obtained from the World-
scope database operated by Refinitiv, which is used 
widely in the literature (e.g. Tori and Onaran 2018a; 
2018b). Where possible, individual missing values for 
some variables were retrieved from corporations’ an-
nual reports. However, for total intangible assets and, 
more importantly, goodwill as a separate variable, 
some missing values remained (Table 2). In addition, 
the standardized data2 contained values of zeros for 
several variables. While for some variables (e.g. com-
mon dividends and share operations), actual values of 
zero are perfectly possible and logical, for others (e.g. 
short- and long-term debt) they are probably inaccu-
rate. Selective cross-checking with published annual 
reports revealed that in such cases, the reports lacked 
more granular data categories, thus explaining the ze-
ros in the standardized Worldscope database. We are 
aware of the resulting data limitations but do not con-
sider them significant enough to considerably limit its 
explorative findings. Unless stated otherwise, all cal-
culations included zeros but excluded missing values. 
It should be noted that because our goal was to picture 
the sector as a whole, both the nominal values as well 
as the ratios were calculated by summing up all values 
rather than calculating mean or median values. 
3.2. Results
We constructed indicators which allow us to vali-
date the three financialization trends identified in 
Variable code Description Missing values (%) Zeros (%)
WC02001 Cash and Short-Term Investments 0 0
WC02501 Property and Plant Equipment Net 0 0
WC02649 Total Intangible Other Assets Net 3.5 3.3
WC18280 Goodwill/Cost in Excess of Assets Purchased 11.5 1.8
WC02999 Total Assets 0 0
WC03051 Short-Term Debt and Current Portion of Long-Term Debt 0.2 6.6
WC03251 Long-Term Debt 0 5.3
WC03501 Common Equity 0 0
WC01001 Net Sales or Revenue 0 0
WC04001 Net Income – Starting Line 0 0
WC04601 Capital Expenditures – Additions to Fixed Assets 0 0
WC01201 Research and Development Expenses 0 0.6
WC05376 Common Dividends (Cash) 0 24.2
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these ten corporations have expanded their cash and 
short-term investment holdings by some 380 percent, 
from USD28 billion in 2000 to 137 billion in 2018, 
while their European counterparts only recorded an 
increase of 53 percent from USD42 billion to 64 bil-
lion in the same period. Further differences can be 
made visible if the corporations are subset by size 
into three groups of nine each (Table 1). Over the 
course of the period studied, both the top and bottom 
nine corporations have not grown their reserves, un-
like the middle ones (Figure 3).
although on a much lower level—machinery (Orhan-
gazi 2018). It should be noted, however, that these 
studies focus exclusively on the US. 
Beyond financial reserves, the 27 pharmaceutical 
corporations have recorded surging liabilities. These 
have escalated by more than 750 percent from USD61 
billion to 518 billion (Figure 4). Most of this growth can 
be attributed to long-term debt. The recent levels are 
thus in line with rising corporate debt burdens glob-
ally in the wake of quantitative easing policies. Such 
levels would not have to be a source of concern by 
themselves if it were not for the rising debt burden in 
relation to corporate performance. However, we see a 
sharp hike here with debt growing from 20 percent of 
sales to 72 percent between 2000 and 2018 (Figure 
5). Generally, the decade following the GFC has seen 
Big Pharma progressively drifting towards higher lev-
els of indebtedness. By and large, this trend holds 
across groups of corporations. US and European cor-
porations only show the slightest differences in their 
ratio of total debt as share of net sales. At the same 
time, the largest nine corporations have incurred less 
debt than the corporations below them (Figure 6). 
Figure 1.
Cash and short-term investments for all 27 corpora-
tions combined
Figure 2.
Cash and short-term investments as share of 
net fixed capital for all (n = 27), US (n = 10) and 
European (n = 10) corporations
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
These results suggest a shift towards a business 
model less rooted in expanding physically productive 
capacity for some (and especially US) corporations, 
providing support to scholarly claims that changes in 
corporate operating modes entail sluggish fixed in-
vestment dynamics. Generalizations, however, need 
to be made cautiously. Our results for corporations’ 
liquid asset ratios are in line with trends known from 
other sectors such as Big Tech (Bryan, Rafferty, and 
Wigan 2017; Fernandez and Hendrikse 2015) and—
Figure 3.
Cash and short-term investments as share of net fixed 
capital for three groups of nine corporations by size
Figure 4.
Short- and long-term debt for all 27 corporations 
combined
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data; n = 26 in 2010, 
otherwise n = 27.
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Offloading profits to shareholders
Big Pharma has had more funds at its disposal over 
time, either through financial reserves, or newly-in-
curred debt. While these funds could have been used 
to primarily expand both physically and intellectually 
productive capacity, what we also see is concomitant 
growth in financial payouts. Through both dividends 
and so-called “share operations” (which include pur-
chases, retirements, conversions and redemptions of 
shared and preferred stock), pharmaceutical corpora-
tions have channelled large amounts of funds out of 
corporate coffers. In 2000, USD30 billion were paid 
out to shareholders through dividends and share op-
erations. By 2018, however, this had risen to USD146 
billion (Figure 7). To be sure, there has been some 
fluctuation but this can almost exclusively be attrib-
uted to the waves of share operations that most cor-
porations do not conduct annually. In addition, it took 
just four years for payouts to regrow to pre-GFC lev-
els. Following the crisis, there has been a steady rise.
To contextualize the level of payouts, we examine 
them against capital expenditures (representing physi-
cally productive capacity) and R&D expenses (repre-
senting intellectually productive capacity). What we see 
is that there has been a general upward development, 
peaking at a ratio of 0.94 in 2018 (Figure 8). Again, up 
and down trends exist but, generally, the post-crisis de-
cade has seen the pharmaceutical corporations conduct 
payouts at a higher level than before. Big Pharma has 
used an increasing portion of its financial resources to 
line the pockets of shareholders rather than increasing its 
investments into productive capacity. Especially for share 
operations, the growing debt we noted above is likely to 
have played some part in benefitting shareholders.
Throughout this period US corporations have ex-
ceeded the payout levels of their European counter-
parts, but the movement has largely occurred in paral-
lel. Importantly, we see that post-GFC payout levels 
are even higher than before the crisis (Figure 8). Eu-
ropean pharmaceutical corporations have been espe-
cially generous in terms of dividends. Starting from a 
ratio of 0.31 in 2000, they paid out a share of 0.49 in 
2018 to their shareholders. Generally, dividends have 
increased in tandem for the top and middle corpora-
tions and stagnated for those at the bottom of the co-
hort (Figure 9). The other channel, share operations, 
has remained relatively stable over time across sizes.
Figure 5.
Short- and long-term debt as share of net sales for all 
(n = 27), US (n = 10) and European (n = 10) corporations
Figure 6.
Short- and long-term debt as share of net sales for 
three groups of nine corporations by size
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
Figure 8.
Dividends and share operations as share of capital 
expenditures and R&D expenses for all (n = 27), US 
(n = 10) and European (n = 10) corporations
Figure 7.
Dividends and share operations for all 27 corpora-
tions combined
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
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Monetizing market power: the rise of intangibles
While payouts have grown in relation to produc-
tive investments, the latter have not fallen as could 
be expected from much of the literature. Instead, 
they have fallen between 2006 and 2011 for both 
US and European corporations and have only re-
cently slightly surpassed their pre-GFC levels (Fig-
ure 10). This suggests that a significant part of the 
incurred debt has been used to retire equity and pay 
shareholders rather than to invest in productive ca-
pacity. What has this meant for Big Pharma’s busi-
ness model?
counted assets and share prices (i.e. goodwill). As 
detailed data on the distinct elements of intangible 
assets are hard to obtain even for large corporations 
like those analyzed here, the best approximation is 
arguably the balance sheet item of total intangible as-
sets. While coverage is incomplete (Table 2), the ex-
isting data suggest tremendous growth. With 23 cor-
porations reporting total intangible assets of USD48 
billion in 2000, this number has grown to USD857 bil-
lion for all 27 corporations in 2018 (Figure 11). Some 
of this growth can presumably be explained by better 
reporting and data coverage, but there is no reason 
to believe it could explain most, let alone all, of it. 
Despite these limits, the data highlights the promi-
nent role of goodwill in particular. In 2000, 18 corpo-
rations reported goodwill of USD18 billion; in 2018, 
25 of them reported USD438 billion. Bearing in mind 
the incomplete data, the actual share of goodwill of 
total intangibles is likely higher than 50 percent. On 
the whole, the rising share of intangible assets to the 
whole corporate asset base signifies changes in Big 
Pharma’s business model. While 23 corporations’ in-
tangible assets only stood at a ratio of 0.13 to total 
assets, they have skyrocketed to a ratio of 0.51 for 
all 27 corporations (Figure 12). In sum, Big Pharma’s 
asset base is now dominated by intangible assets 
and goodwill.
Figure 9.
Dividends and share operations as share of capital 
expenditures and R&D expenses for three groups of 
nine corporations by size
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
Figure 10.
Capital expenditures and R&D expenses as share of 
net sales for all (n = 27), US (n = 10) and European 
(n = 10) corporations
Falling, stagnant or only moderately rising invest-
ment in physical and intellectual productive capacity 
has been linked to the concomitant growth of intan-
gible assets across industries (Orhangazi 2018). “In-
tangible assets” is an ambiguous residual category 
that may represent anything from codified and un-
codified market power (i.e. brands, patents, licenses 
or customer relations) to the differences between ac-
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
Total intangibles 2000: n = 23; 2001-2002: n = 25 ; 2003-2012: n = 26; 
2013-2018: n = 27; goodwill 2000: n = 18; 2001-2002: n = 21; 2003/2005 n 
= 23; 2004/2006-2007/2013: n = 24; 2011-2012/2015-2018: n = 25; 2008-
2010: n = 26.
Figure 11.
Total intangible assets and goodwill for all 27 corpo-
rations combined
This assessment does not change if the corpora-
tions are grouped by region (Figure 12) or size (Figure 
13). The fact that US corporations report a lower ratio 
of intangible assets, including goodwill, than their Eu-
ropean peers must be considered in the light of their 
higher shares of cash and short-term investments pre-
sumably diluting the intangible ratio (Figure 2).
The heavier weight of intangible assets on cor-
porate balance sheets has important ramifications. 
Since corporate performance is often measured in 
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terms of its total return on assets (ROA), an expand-
ed asset base runs the risk of driving down profit-
ability. We find rough evidence for such trends in our 
data: the ROA ratio of all corporations has fallen from 
0.16 in 2000 to 0.07 in 2018, dipping as low as 0.04 
in 2017 (Figure 14). However, it also becomes clear 
that the ROA ratio has not fallen at the same rate as 
the intangible asset ratio has risen. Possible reasons 
for this could include the growth of net income and 
the substitution of fixed assets by intangible assets, 
thus slowing the expansion of total assets and the 
deterioration of the ROA ratio.
4. Discussion
Having investigated Big Pharma’s financial ac-
counts in relation to three key dimensions of corpo-
rate financialization, we can now relate our findings 
to the existing literature on the pharmaceutical sec-
tor. Fundamentally, this sector is comprised of an un-
balanced market structure in which a small number 
of large pharmaceutical corporations dominate the 
value chain (Baranes 2016). This enables them to 
increasingly generate rent incomes at the expense 
of firms located at the bottom of the value chain by 
utilizing their market power, as we demonstrated, by 
providing evidence of a surging intangible asset ratio 
among Big Pharma firms. These rent incomes can 
then be passed on in growing measure to sharehold-
ers, the latter of which are dominated by institutional 
investors (Montalban and Sakinç 2013). As a result, 
an overabundance of financial resources at the top 
coexists with a shortage at the bottom (i.e. small- and 
medium-sized biotech firms). At the bottom of the 
value chain, public investments, public guarantees 
and publicly funded research in universities dominate 
R&D (Lazonick and Tulum 2011). This collective and 
incremental knowledge production in the foundation-
al stage is then enclosed, commodified and valorized 
in later stages of the value chain through IPRs by Big 
Pharma, as Zeller (2007: 102) has observed: 
“The markets created by the extension of the intellec-
tual property monopolies connect the academic re-
search institutes, the biotech companies often set up 
by university researchers, and the large pharmaceuti-
cal companies. The firms pursue different strategies 
to extract rents. In principle, monopolistic property 
rights can be established along the whole value-add-
ed chain. This market structure is important for the 
type of financialization that evolved in this sector.”
The unequal distribution of market power in the 
pharmaceutical value chain, whereby collectively 
produced and publicly financed fundamental knowl-
edge is monopolized and acquired by corporations, 
with the ability to generate rent incomes, is a key 
characteristic of the contemporary pharmaceutical 
sector (Baranes 2017). By comparing the scientific 
co-publication and patent co-ownership of Roche, 
Pfizer and Novartis, Rikap (2019: 1006–7) identified 
Figure 13: ; (source: own cal-
culations based on Worldscope 
data)
Figure 12.
Total intangible assets as share of total assets for 
all (2000: n = 23; 2001-2002: n = 25; 2003-2012: n 
= 26; 2013-2018: n = 27), US (2000: n = 6; 2001-
2002: n = 8; 2003-2012: n = 9; 2013-2018: n = 10), 
and European (n = 10) corporations
Figure 14.
Net income as share of total assets for all (n = 27), 
US (n = 10) and European (n = 10) corporations
Figure 13.
Total intangible assets as share of total assets for three 
groups of nine corporations by size (top: n = 9; middle: 
n = 8 (2000), otherwise n = 9; bottom n = 6 (2000), n = 
7 (2001-2002), n = 8 (2003-2012), n = 9 (2013-2018))
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
Source: own calculations based on Worldscope data.
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“a subordination of the universities, public research 
organizations and start-ups that have a fundamental 
role in the former, but an almost negligible partici-
pation in the latter”. In contrast to the fundamental 
R&D carried out by actors at the bottom of the val-
ue chain, the pharmaceutical corporations’ internal 
R&D mainly covers clinical testing and regulatory 
approval (Baranes 2016: 201; Froud et al. 2006: 
173). Essentially, Big Pharma operates akin to pri-
vate equity funds with special abilities to acquire, 
develop, market and extract value out of enclosed 
knowledge, as Baranes (2016) argued for the case 
of Pfizer. The unique abilities of large pharmaceu-
tical corporations to transform ideas into monopo-
lized commodities lie at the heart of their rent-seek-
ing and financialization strategies. 
Big Pharma corporations moreover compete in the 
acquisition of monopolized knowledge through the 
commodification of IPRs. Firms that possess IPRs—or 
merely exhibit the potential to create them—therefore 
become commodities on a marketplace. The value of 
these firms in the market for M&As is related to their 
portfolio of IPRs. As new potentially successful drugs 
are scarce and there is a constant pressure to replace 
patents that are approaching the end of their cycle, the 
price of firms increases with the stages of pharmaceu-
tical development. In addition to the demand for IPRs, 
Big Pharma is equipped with financial reserves and 
access to easy credit, thereby driving up the price of 
firms in their competition to monopolize innovations. 
This intensifies risks in the sector, as future success 
is a “known unknown”. Yet Big Pharma depends on 
future rent income from IPRs, increasing the prices 
of firms at different stages of development. Or, in the 
words of Andersson et al. (2010: 362):
“In this financialized business model, the investor 
is not participating in a marathon but instead, com-
peting in a relay where handing the baton on to the 
next investor secures a (possible) realised gain on 
invested equity funds. Bio-pharma investment is a 
speculative bet on scientific discoveries and is simi-
lar, in this respect to oil, gas and mineral exploration 
where Federal Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory 
approval is like striking oil or finding the seam.”
The Veblenian theory of the firm resonates in fun-
damental ways with these empirical findings. The 
Veblenian firm’s bifurcation according to the logic 
of industry and business is central to understanding 
the financialization processes in the pharmaceuti-
cal sector. As Big Pharma has begun to operate in-
creasingly like a private equity fund, the business 
logic is clearly in the driving seat of industry. The 
subordination of industry by business means that 
the economic triage—that is, the decision about 
what is allowed to proceed from the stage of con-
cepts and fundamental research to be developed 
into marketable products—has come to be deter-
mined by a limited set of financial metrics.
The examination of 27 of the world’s largest phar-
maceutical firms displays how a combination of ele-
ments produced a particular demotion of industry 
by business, although the precise causal channels 
cannot be determined without in-depth study of man-
agement considerations (Froud et al. 2006). Growing 
financial reserves and mounting debt provided fuel 
for M&A cycles while investments in productive ca-
pacity have not kept pace. Compounded by the pres-
sure of expiring patents, these developments led to 
a sector-wide drive towards acquiring ‘blockbuster’ 
biotech firms which themselves became desirable 
commodities. The competition for the assets of such 
firms, big and small, has propelled prices upward and 
produced a large goodwill bubble in the sector. 
As described above, goodwill reflects the premium 
payed in an M&A process between corporations and 
is an intangible asset, formally justified by potential 
future income that the underlying asset may gener-
ate. If this income is not generated, the value of the 
goodwill needs to be adjusted. A downward adjust-
ment of goodwill is recorded as a loss in the income 
statement (i.e. a loss in the value of the assets of 
the firm). This means that the growing premium that 
corporations pay for the acquisition of others results 
in direct pressures to generate higher profit margins. 
Goodwill becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: its out-
look on potential future income shapes the actual 
business model (Andersson, Haslam, and Lee 2006). 
Large M&As during the 1990s and 2000s, as docu-
mented by Montalban and Sakinç (2013: 1010) have 
thus left their imprint on the balance sheets of Big 
Pharma. The ensuing drive to maintain stable corpo-
rate performance metrics might thus entail changes 
in the productive model (such as outsourcing) as well 
as higher charges for consumers. 
It is important to understand the corporations’ pre-
dicament here: while growing intangibles, including 
goodwill, have the potential to adversely affect gen-
eral profitability, corporations might hesitate to write 
them off. This is because writing off intangible assets 
would need to be balanced by writing off liabilities on 
the other side of the corporate balance sheet. Since 
debt cannot be written off, the burden would fall 
on equity, meaning retained earnings would be re-
duced. These earnings, however, are crucial to justi-
fy payouts, and reducing them would hinder corpora-
tions’ shareholder value policies. As a consequence, 
potentially disruptive volumes of intangible assets 
might be kept on the books to protect the benefits of 
shareholders.
Aimed at taking advantage of contextual monetary 
opportunities, this business logic is fundamentally 
unstable and severely undermines the logic of indus-
try. This instability revolves around the levels of cor-
porate debt that were not used productively but for 
payouts to shareholders and for excessive premiums 
in the acquisition of firms instead. 
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As the world stopped spinning in March 2020, 
when the Covid-19 pandemic found its way into fi-
nancial markets and immobilized the daily life of bil-
lions of people around the planet, the underlying vul-
nerabilities of the model of corporate financialization 
have become increasingly evident. After a decade of 
cheap credit combined with high payouts and lower 
levels of investment, firms struggle to repay their 
debt. The subordination of industry by business has 
led to the primacy of short-term financial engineer-
ing over long-term stability, hollowing out the physical 
asset base of corporations in favour of intangible as-
sets whose viability is jeopardized in times of reced-
ing market liquidity.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we have employed a Veblenian 
framework to analyze three dimensions of corporate 
financialization that provide a clearer assessment 
of the level of financialization in firms and sectors of 
the economy than existing analyses which pertain to 
merely one dimension. These three dimensions in-
clude the expansion of the balance sheet, the grow-
ing levels of financial payouts and the rising impor-
tance of intangible assets. 
We examined these trends against the financial 
accounts of 27 of the largest pharmaceutical corpora-
tions, which enabled a new scale and scope of com-
parative analysis (e.g. US versus European firm dy-
namics). We note that some Big Pharma corporations 
have grown their balance sheets by turning towards 
higher shares of liquid assets and, more recently, sig-
nificantly higher shares of debt. However, the trend 
towards liquid assets, and cash in particular, is much 
more pronounced for US corporations, which likely un-
derscores the importance of tax avoidance on unrepa-
triated profits. In other ways, Big Pharma corporations 
from the US and from Europe exhibit similar dynamics, 
especially in terms of their shift from a business mod-
el focused on productive capacity (reflected by fixed 
capital and research and development (R&D)) to one 
focused on intangible assets (reflected by patents, 
brands and in particular goodwill). Here, intangible as-
sets both reflect established patterns of market power 
and the capacity to extract rent incomes as well as the 
capitalized anticipated capacity to do so. Against this 
capacity, Big Pharma can then borrow to gather the fi-
nancial resources that are needed to acquire new mo-
nopolizable knowledge or increase financial payouts 
to shareholders. The latter have increased drastically 
during the past two decades, in ways which erode Big 
Pharma’s funds and profitability metrics. Furthermore, 
more money is increasingly spent on shareholder en-
richment relative to that which is invested in the devel-
opment of pharmaceuticals, as seen by a deteriorat-
ing ratio of payouts to capital expenditures and R&D 
expenses. In its current state, access to debt strongly 
facilitates this business model.
In the pharmaceutical sector, revenue crucially de-
pends on the acquisition of knowledge which can be 
monopolized in the form of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), where the holder can demand rent payments 
for its use. While an important share of this knowl-
edge is primarily generated outside of Big Pharma 
in the realm of publicly funded research and related 
operations, the corporations nevertheless act as con-
duits to acquire, enclose and valorize knowledge for 
shareholder gain. The enhanced market power of Big 
Pharma is reflected in the rise of intangible assets 
on the balance sheet of firms, both in general and in 
specific terms (e.g. goodwill). 
This rentier aspect is related to the state-capture 
machinery of the pharmaceutical sector (UNCTAD 
2017). It reflects the structural power of Big Pharma 
over decision-making in the largest economies. Pub-
lic institutions depend on pharmaceutical firms to 
guarantee access to medicine, while pharmaceutical 
corporations depend on state institutions to approve 
medicine and allocate public financial resources to 
fundamental research. This mutual dependency, 
combined with relatively high public expenditure on 
the purchase of medicine—often comparable to other 
major state expenses such as defence—has resulted 
in excessive influence on state-run bodies that regu-
late the market, approve medicine and allocate public 
funds for fundamental research. The exceptional de-
gree of structural power is a vital political economic 
feature we need to consider if we are to assess the 
modern-day importance of the Veblenian under-
standing of privatized social knowledge and how it 
propels corporate financialization. 
Our paper not only contributes to the literature on 
Big Pharma, but also to the debate on how to study 
corporate financialization. We have proposed a Ve-
blenian analytical framework that allows investiga-
tions into a range of sectors and industries. Rather 
than focusing on one key measure of financialization, 
we have presented an integrated analysis of three 
main indicators of corporate financialization: the ex-
pansion of the balance sheet, the growing reliance on 
intangible assets and the increasing use of corporate 
funds for financial payouts. This framework allows 
future studies to be more balanced and conclusive 
regarding not only the extent but also the nature of 
corporate financialization. Or, in other words, it en-
ables us to lift the lid of the black box by disentan-
gling how various elements of financialization do 
(not) co-evolve over time, throughout and between 
industries, and between countries or global regions. 
Accordingly, the framework presented here suggests 
opportunities for sectoral as well as cross-sectoral 
and comparative analyses of corporate financializa-
tion across a broader geography.
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Notes
[1] At first glance, Veblen’s “sharpest kind of separation bet-
ween business and industry” (Sweezy 1958: 21) is, of 
course, questionable from both theoretical and historical 
perspectives of socio-economic dynamics. However, as 
Waller (1982) explains in more detail, and Jo and Henry 
(2015) illustrate, this supposedly superficial dichotomy 
is ultimately based on a more complex understanding 
of technology and institutions and has been updated by 
later institutionalist work.
[2] For comparability reasons, all numeric variables (Table 
2) were automatically transformed into US dollars based 
on Thomson Reuters’ historical exchange rates.
[3] We do not analyze the corporations here grouped as 
“other” because they do not share any characteristics 
aside from being non-US/European.
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